We test the hypothesis of the circular causality between trade costs and degree of economic development using data on Italian provinces. Using different methods to control for multilateral resistance, we apply a gravity equation to estimate sectoral exports to 188 countries over the period [1995][1996][1997][1998][1999][2000][2001][2002][2003][2004]. Provincial trade costs are constructed as the sum of five province-specific elasticities, including distance, adjacency, and common money. We find that Italian provinces are heterogeneous with respect to trade costs. These costs are influenced by lagged provincial per capita income and industrial structure. In turn, trade costs influence future provincial per capita income. This two-way relationship between trade costs and income is broadly consistent with the cumulative causation process emphasized by the New Economic Geography.
I. INTRODUCTION
In this paper we test the hypothesis of the circular causality between trade costs (TCs) and degree of economic development using data on Italian provinces. This bi-directional causality is a typical implication of New Economic Geography (NEG) models but, to our knowledge, it has not been tested before. To motivate our hypothesis, we draw on the link between TCs and cross-border trade flows and the link between TCs and spatial economic disparities.
There is ample evidence that TCs play an important role in international trade. A decline in international transportation costs, a component of TCs, is a likely cause underlying the sharp rise of world trade relative to world output that has occurred over the last fifty years (Hummels, 2007) .
Transportation costs rise with distance and, consequently, close countries tend to trade more than distant countries. Trade-enhancing characteristics that counteract transportation costs are: common language (Helliwell, 1999; Hutchinson, 2002) , common colonial roots (Rauch, 1999) , shared religion (Kang and Fratianni, 2006) , immigrant links to the home country (Gould, 1994; Head and Ries, 1998) or more generally ethnic networks (Rauch and Trindade, 2001) , and similarity in economic development (Fratianni and Kang, 2006) . Beyond culture, cross-border trade is influenced by institutions such as regional trade agreements (Carrère, 2006; Baier and Bergstrand, 2009 ) and common money (Rose, 2000; Rose and van Wincoop, 2001; Frankel and Rose, 2002) .
Last but not least, national borders are a big impediment to trade (McCallum, 1995; Helliwell, 1998; Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003; Chen, 2004) . Behrens et al. (2007) break down the complex range of TCs in a transportation component and a non-transportation component (e.g., border-related impediments and differences in languages and in monies). These authors find that the former impacts on the location of firms whereas the latter exerts a global impact. In their extensive survey, Anderson and van Wincoop (2004, 691-2 ; AvW henceforth) estimate that TCs represent the equivalent of a 170 percent ad-valorem tax barrier to trade, of which 21 percent attributable to transportation costs, 44 percent to border-related impediments, and 55 percent to distribution costs.
In sum, TCs are large and complex. An often cited paper by Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000) argues that
TCs are the common cause to six major puzzles in international macroeconomics.
TCs are also critical in NEG, which is concerned with the spatial distribution of production facilities and agglomeration factors. Krugman (1991) , the leader of NEG, develops a core-periphery model that hinges critically on the interaction of transportation costs with scale economies in production.
1 The model features a sector, agriculture, with constant returns to scale and an immobile factor of production, land, and another sector, manufacturing, with increasing returns to scale and a mobile factor, labor. Pecuniary spillovers trigger a "circular causation" process whereby manufacturing tends to concentrate in locations with large markets that, in turn, lead to more concentration because those locations enjoy lower effective prices and attract mobile labor. The outcome is the endogenous formation of a richer industrial core and a poorer agricultural periphery, or more generally regional economic disparities. The income differences result from differences in prices, with workers in the core enjoying higher real wages than in the periphery. Agglomeration accentuates as transportation costs decline, giving more incentive to footloose manufacturing to 1 On this point, see the survey article by Head and Mayer (2004) .
relocate. Agglomeration can also arise through cost and demand linkages stemming from firms using intermediate goods (Venables, 1996) or through innovation (Martin and Ottaviano, 2001 ).
The spatial distribution of industrial activities and income is affected critically by TCs.
When TCs are high, interregional trade is low and industrial activities are widely diffused. As TCs decline, agglomeration, with its attendant benefits of increasing returns and external economies, develops in core areas (what is core is largely a path-dependent process). Agglomeration is fed by the industrial sector drawing the mobile factor, say labor. If labor is mobile only between sectors in the same region, the agglomeration process reaches a turning point when real wage differentials are sufficiently high to induce firms to relocate from the high-wage agglomerated region to the lowwage non-agglomerated region. In this case, periods of industrial concentration are followed by periods of a more even spatial distribution of industrial activities (Puga 1999; ).
The spatial distribution of per capita income will also mimic such a pattern. If labor is instead mobile among regions, the agglomeration process in the core region will continue until real returns on labor are equalized across regions. In this case, the spatial distribution of industrial activities remains asymmetric and regional economic development is heterogeneous. In sum, causality runs from TCs to agglomeration and income. But there is also the opposite causality from agglomeration to TCs. The core attracts firms and labor from the periphery because it enjoys higher productivity, including sectors such as information services and distribution that are so important for international and interregional trade. Scale economies from agglomeration reduce TCs. The core also benefits from better infrastructure and public administration resulting from agglomeration, which tend to reduce TCs. In the end, causality is potentially bi-directional.
To test our hypothesis, we follow a two-step approach. First, we estimate provincial TCs using a gravity equation (GE) applied to bilateral trade flows from the viewpoint of a country, Italy, that shares common culture and national institutions, but suffers from regional disparities. Second, we test the mentioned two-way causality between provincial TCs and provincial per capita income, our measure of economic development. While Italy is not the only industrial country with regional disparities, its heterogeneity is long dated: the Mezzogiorno problem, or the relative low degree of economic development of the Italian South, goes back to the creation of the nation in 1861 and has defied decades of large government transfers from the North to the South over the last fifty years.
Much has been written on the subject both inside and outside Italy; space permits only a few references. Lutz (1962) is among the first to analyze in depth the Italian dual economy, which exists not only geographically but also across industries. Her policy prescription is wage flexibility in the South and interregional mobility of labor and capital. Chenery (1962, 515) examines the policy of the Italian government "to carry out the theoretically attractive procedure of developing external economies by a massive dose of public works while leaving the direct investment in commodity production to private individuals." This policy has continued to these days despite the persistence of the North-South economic divide. Labor mobility across regions remains relatively low (Mocetti and Porello, 2010) , a fact that is difficult to reconcile with the gap in per capita income. The twin occurrence of large geographic economic differences and labor immobility remains an "empirical puzzle" (Faini et al. 1997 ).
The literature on regional disparities has gone beyond the North-South characterization. For example, Bagnasco (1977) identifies three distinct economic areas: an old capital-intensive NorthWest, which he calls First Italy; an agricultural and backward South, which he calls Second Italy;
and a newer North-East and parts of the Center, which he calls Third Italy. Third Italy is replete with dynamic small and medium size firms that outsource production and are located in industrial districts (Brusco, 1990 ). These districts specialize in different products and are distinctive in their development paths, local institutions, and manners of generating externalities (Becattini, 1990 (Becattini, , 2007 .
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The paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we discuss the general form of GE in the presence of multilateral TCs. In Section III, we formulate the empirical equations of our two-step approach. Section IV discusses the data. Section V presents and analyzes the findings. Section VI deals with robustness tests. Conclusions are drawn in the last section.
II. THE GRAVITY EQUATION AND MULTILATERAL TRADE COSTS
In a well-known paper, McCallum (1995) 
where X = exports from i to j, Y = nominal income, t = bilateral TC factor, P = multilateral TC factor (i.e., consumer price index), σ = elasticity of substitution among goods, and i, j, and w indicate, respectively, exporter country, importer country and the world. Assuming that t ij is a function of bilateral distance and one plus the tariff-equivalent bilateral border barrier, AvW estimate with nonlinear least squares a simultaneous system of equations on cross-section data.
Their main result is that borders reduce trade in the range of 20 to 50 percent, that is much less than the border found by McCallum.
The AvW estimation procedure is rather cumbersome and other authors have sought simpler alternatives. Baier and Bergstrand (2009) 
III. EMPIRICAL SPECIFICATION OF THE TWO-STEP APPROACH
We discuss in this section the empirical procedure and econometric methodology underlying the two-step approach. In the first part, we focus on the construction of provincial TCs. These are the sum of five components: distance, adjacency, common and different regional trade agreements, and common money. In the second part, we lay out the model of circular causation between provincial TCs and provincial per capita income.
Step 1: Gravity equation and provincial trade costs
The specification of TCs is the subject of theoretical and empirical debate; see, for example, Fingleton and McCann (2007) . 
negative since the elasticity of substitution σ is larger than unity; the four semi-elasticities
are positive, except for β 2 < 0 when the RTA is trade diverting; ε ijt is an idiosyncratic error. 4 The implied TC specification requires data on total consumption of goods only produced by the province. Since we lack inter-provincial trade flows, we cannot implement this procedure. 5 All Italian provinces share the same regional trade agreements and currency. While RTA, InterRTA, and MONEY have a global impact, their provincial export elasticities can differ due to different frequencies of these three factors in each province. Sixteen Italian provinces are adjacent to either France, Switzerland, Austria, and Slovenia. 6 Italian, as the majority's language, is only spoken in Italy. Colonial relationships with former colonies Libya, Somalia and Eritrea were too short lived to be of any relevance. Emigrants' relationships are primarily with the home country. Furthermore, these relationships have diminished over time and are captured in our model by importer country FE.
Sectoral distance elasticities are estimated under the restriction that these elasticities are common to all provinces (a restriction imposed by data availability). Provincial distance elasticities are then computed as the weighted average of sectoral export distance elasticities, where the weights are given by the average shares of provincial sectoral exports. This approach ignores the potentially positive effects on distance resulting from the interaction between industrial sectors and location generated, among other things, by agglomeration externalities (Fratianni and Marchionne, 2008) . Thus, our test is conservative because it works against our hypothesis. Distance in (3) is replaced by the interaction of distance with sectoral dummies. Since coefficient β 0 varies among sectors, our testable GE assumes the following form:
where K is the number of sectors, and δ(k) is a sector dummy. 
In the language of Behrens et al. (2007) , RTA, InterRTA and MONEY would qualify as non-transport costs with a "global impact" on trade.
8 Denoting with K, J and T, respectively, the number of sectors, importing countries and years, i β is: better than a pure OLS because the latter fails to control for all specific effects (Egger 2000) .
Method (b) applies specific effects to province-country pairs, but not to individual exporter provinces and importer countries ( Step 2: TC-income circular causation
The second step in our research strategy involves testing the bi-directional causality between TCs and provincial per capita income, our proxy of economic development. We have already mentioned that NEG underscores both the impact of TCs on income as well as the impact of income on TCs.
This circular causation is tested with the following two equations: In the actual tests, g(.) and h(.) are linearized. Lagged regressors are employed to minimize endogeneity problems due to simultaneity ( i β , however, being a panel estimate is centered in the middle of the time period). It should also be noted that i β are retrieved from heteroskedastic (4) and used in (5a)-(5b). We correct for heteroskedasticity in (5) with robust standard errors.
IV. DATA
Different datasets are used to estimate provincial TCs (Step 1) and circular causation (
Step 2).
Step 1 In these instances, export data overestimate the true but unknown value of exports (AvW, 2004).
We eliminate sector "Ships and aircrafts, etc." because it lacks a specific destination and exports to politically undefined areas (e.g., Antarctica) or remote parts of a country (e.g., Denmark's Greenland). ISTAT is also the source of provincial population and income, the latter measured as the sum of value added in agriculture, industry and services except public sector and financial services.
Country income and population come from the World Development Indicators (WDI) of the World Bank. We lose some records in merging the two datasets because of the mismatching between ISTAT export destination and WDI country definition (e.g., Timor-Leste). We lose records
This procedure eliminates common factors and detrends idiosyncratic factors. In other words, the mean-adjusted provincial TC is the difference between provincial TC, with a positive sign, and its mean value over all provinces, again with a positive sign. 12 In contrast to US states, trade flows among Italian provinces are not recorded; see footnote 4. because income is not reported for some countries (e.g., Brunei). These inevitable trimmings, however, are of little consequence for the final research outcome. Variable d ij is measured as the kilometric geodesic distance between province i's capital and country j's capital. Data on provincial latitude and longitude are provided by the official web sites of each province; data on capitals' latitude and longitude are from the World Factbook of the Central Intelligence Agency.
As to institutional factors, we define 11 separate RTAs, with year of entry and exit of each member. 13 Italy is a member of the European Union and when a province trades with a country that is a member of another RTA, the InterRTA dummy is equal to one. Information on common money, the euro, comes from the European Commission. Average provincial exports are $2.6 billion with a standard deviation 7 times larger than the mean. There is no rounding bias because ISTAT reports all export values. Figure 1 shows that provincial exports have a profile consistent with a log-normal distribution. In the GE, the normality of the dependent variable is critical because estimation is done basically with OLS.
13 These are the European Union (EU), US-IS, NAFTA, CARICOM, PATCRA, ANZCERTA, CACM, MECOSUR, ASEAN, SPARTECA, and ANDEAN; see Oh (2006) Table 2 suggests a moderate zero flow problem. We will return to this issue in the robustness section of the paper.
Step 2 
HC. The lower median values than mean values suggest that INF, INS, SC, but especially for HC,
have left-skewed distributions. All variables, except HC, have a standard deviation that is at least 66 percent higher than the mean, again suggesting strong heterogeneity across provinces; see maps in Figure 2 for a visual inspection of these patterns.
[Insert Table 1a , Table 1b, Figure 1 , Table 2 , and Figure 2 here]
V. FINDINGS
Step 1 findings Income elasticity is statistically different from one for Italian provinces and partner countries except for provinces under method (b). The RTA semi-elasticity suggests that EU-15 has been a hindrance to trade for its members. This result is in line with Frankel's (1997) model that shows that an expanding RTA reduces welfare and other evidence that finds that the EU has expanded beyond its "optimal size" (Fratianni and Oh, 2009). In our paper, the impact of RTA on exports changes according to the method: negative under methods (a) and (c) and statistically insignificant under method (b). It is likely that country FEs soak up a great deal of the RTA effects.
In fact, when we drop country FEs under method (b), the statistical significance of RTA disappears.
InterRTA semi-elasticity, as well, changes according to the method: negative under method (a), 19 In some cases, FE are collinear also with RTA or MONEY because of the low variability of these dummy variables.
positive under method (b), and statically insignificant under method (c). Again, we suspect that Step 2 findings Table 4 presents the results of equations (5a) [Insert Table 4a and Table 4b here]
In sum, TCs and provincial per capita income influence each other, while the vector C i of control variables that are typically associated with economic development and TCs, impact endingperiod per capita income but not TCs, with the exception of industrial structure. It is worth noting that the statistical significance of industrial structure is relatively low (10 percent). It is somewhat puzzling that TCs are insensitive to infrastructure, given the long commitment of the Italian government to invest in public works in the Mezzogiorno. A plausible explanation for this result has been offered by Puga (1999, 328) : "The combination of minimal interregional migration with wage setting at the national sectoral level may help understand why infrastructure improvements have failed to help the Italian Mezzogiorno catch with the North of the country..." With interregional labor immobility and real wage differences, industrial spreading would occur with firms relocating from high-wage-agglomerated (and congested) areas to low-wage-unagglomerated areas. A common national wage rate, as it is true in Italy, could undo this mechanism.
VI. ROBUSTNESS
Step 1 robustness
Consider high-TC provinces that trade only with close countries. For those provinces bilateral trade with long-distance countries would be counted as zero trade flows. Hence, there is a potential that zero trade flows may bias upward the algebraic estimate of the distance elasticity. Under these circumstances, a log-linear GE specification and OLS estimation may be inappropriate for three reasons (Burger et al., 2009) . The first has to do with the way zero trade flows are treated.
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Bilateral trade, at some level of disaggregation, is frequently zero or missing (Frankel, 1997; Haveman and Hummels, 2004) . 21 Since these zeros do not occur randomly (Rauch, 1999) , their omission could bias the estimates of trade determinants (Linders and De Groot, 2006) . The second is the bias created by the logarithmic transformation: the concavity of the log function, under OLS, imparts a downward bias because of the Jensen's inequality (Haworth and Vincent, 1979) . The third is the failure of the homoskedasticity assumption. With non-negative exports, the variance of exports conditional on exogenous variables declines as the conditional mean of exports approaches the lower zero limit (Santo-Silva and Tenreyro, 2006) . Trade data are potentially heteroskedastic, whereas the log-normal model assumes homoskedasticity. In these cases, OLS estimations are inconsistent and inefficient. 20 The assumption of log-normality in the random component implies the double-logarithmic specification that predicts positive trade flows. In contrast, the multiplicative GE can predict zero values. 21 Zeros can occur either because some country pairs do not trade, or rounding errors, or observations are mistakenly recorded as zero. Santos-Silva and Tenreyro (2006) reckon that measurement errors may pose a more serious problem than the log-linear transformation bias.
To deal with these issues, researchers have either omitted zero trade flows, or arbitrarily added a small positive number to all trade flows so that their logarithm is well-defined, or used a TOBIT estimator with zero lower limit for trade flows, or relied on the Heckman selection model criterion. All these standard solutions, however, have their own problems. Table 5 here]
Step 2 robustness
We perform four different types of robustness exercises concerning equations (5a)-(5b). The first is to add IND(LG/SM) to IND to check the hypothesis that exports are driven primarily by large and more profitable enterprises, as suggested by Helpman et al. (2008) . Our findings do not support this hypothesis; see column TC1 of Table 4a . Nor do we find a significant impact of IND(LG/SM) on the income regression; see IN1 in Table 4b . The second is to employ alternative measures of INF, 22 The zero omission option involves a data truncation and leads to biased results, especially with non randomly distributed zero flows (Eichengreen and Irwin, 1998) ; the constant addition option generates regression coefficients either decreasing with the size of the added constant (Flowerdew and Aitkin, 1982) or unsystematically higher or lower than the added constant (King, 1988) Table 4b ). The implication is that under the expansive definition of TC, IND and HC affect income indirectly through TCs. Our conclusion is that the instability of the RTA and InterRTA coefficients in Table 3 argues for the benchmark TC specification. The final exercise relates to the use of estimated parameters as regressors, that is the retrieval of the betas from step 1 to step 2. We follow Saxonhouse (1976) and use a bootstrap procedure -with 100, 1,000 and 10,000 replicationsto estimate the standard errors of the parameter estimates. The results do not change with respect to robust standard errors.
In sum, our robustness exercise confirms the main findings of the previous section.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
The key result of the paper is that regional economic development and trade costs in Italy are related to each other through a circular causation pattern: lower TCs raise per capita income, but higher per capita income, in turn, reduces TCs through a virtuous circle. Our approach consists of two steps. In the first step, we estimate, with a gravity model, sectoral distance elasticities from 103
Italian provinces exporting 21 export categories to 188 countries under the restriction that these elasticities are common to all provinces; these sectoral elasticities are then weighed by the provincial export mix. Provincial TCs are the sum of several separate elasticities, of which only one is a distance elasticity. By design, this approach ignores the potentially positive effects on TCs emanating from the interaction of industrial sectors and location generated, among other things, by agglomeration externalities. By so doing, our test works against our hypothesis. The spatial distribution of provincial TCs appears to be consistent with the main implications of agglomeration theory: with few exceptions, provinces in the "First Italy" (North-West) and "Third Italy" (NorthEast and parts of the Center) face lower TCs than provinces in the developing South. To our knowledge, this is the first paper that applies the gravity equation to trading pairs whose bilateral distances differ by extremely small measure.
In the second step, we test the bi-directional causality between TCs and provincial per capita income, our proxy of economic development, drawing from the insights of the New Economic Geography. In addition to the interaction between trade costs and provincial per capita income, we find that control variables that are typically associated with economic development impact provincial per capita income but not TCs. We explain this finding, in part, with the institutional practice in Italy to bargain for a nation-wide sectoral wage rate, a practice that tends to counteract the positive effects of government investment programs in the poorer regions of the country and reduces firms' incentives to relocate from richer agglomerated to poorer nonagglomerated areas.
One obvious policy implication of our paper is that government should promote reductions of TCs through efficiency-increasing reforms that would benefit disproportionately the backward regions of the country. The other policy implication, greatly opposed by trade unions, is to encourage wage bargaining that would set wages at the regional rather than at the national level. ISTAT (i=103, j=1, k=1, t=10) ; Panel B: statistics on countries from World Development Indicator (i=1, j=188, k=1, t=10); Panel C: statistics on province-countrysector from ISTAT (i=103, j=188, k=21, t=10). Table 1b for variable meaning. Robust standard errors (same results with bootstrap method); TC0 = benchmark specification for 3 components trade costs; TC0 + = benchmark specification for 5 components trade costs; TCx = robustness using alternative or additional measure for the corresponding control. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Table 1b for variable meaning. Robust standard errors (same results with bootstrap method); IN0 = benchmark specification using 3 components trade costs; IN0 + = benchmark specification using 5 components trade costs; INx = robustness using alternative or additional measure for the corresponding control. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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